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LATEST SOVIET NOTE INDICATES
USSR'S ATTITUDE TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS

I.   During the last three months the Malenkov

regime has turned down all Western invita-

tions to talks:

A.   A series of four Soviet notes has

developed new excuses for avoiding

four-power talks on Germany.

     In its latest note of 3 November,

     the USSR demands that the West

     agree first to a conference includ-

     ing Communist China on "interna-

     tional tensions."

     The Kremlin's evasive attitude prob-

     ably springs from a recognition of the

     weakness of its propaganda position in

     view of its refusal to make any compro-

     mise involving the present frontiers

     of the orbit.

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C. At the same time, continued unrest in East Germany and Adenauer's electoral Success may have increased the USSR's unwillingness to offer any sort of election proposal in answer to Western demands.

II. This note makes completely clear what has been implied in several previous ones: the Soviet Union is only willing to discuss Germany at a four-power foreign ministers meeting in conjunction with talks which include China on the broad field of inter-national tensions.

III. This note and the previous one mentioned several topics suitable for five-power talks:

A. Foreign bases;

B. The armaments race;

C. The danger of war propaganda;

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  D. Establishment of Communist China's

    "rights" in the UN and other inter-

    national discussions;

  E. Other problems in Asia.

IV. This note, like the previous three, reveals

  an increasingly intransigent attitude on

  the German issue itself:

  A. It is the first official statement

    that the ratification of EDC would make

    impossible the restoration of Germany

    as a united state; according to the

    USSR, consideration of the German

    problem at a four-power foreign minis-

    ters conference would then be pointless.

  B. This note particularly stresses that a

    discussion of foreign bases is a pre-

    requisite to any German settlement.

  C. The Soviet formula for a German settle-

    ment described in previous notes

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remains unchanged. The foreign min-

isters should set up:

1. A peace conference on Germany, to

    consider a draft treaty drawn up

    by the four powers. The West has

    held that free elections must be

    the first order of business.

2. A provisional all-German govern-

    ment which would plan and conduct

    elections without the interference

    of other powers. This would not

    meet Western guarantees for free

    elections.

V. The new note criticizes the Western sug-

gestion for talks on European security:

A. The USSR denies that EDC is in any way

    compatible with European security.

B. It insists that only its own formula

    for a German settlement will guarantee

    European security.

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    C.   It cites its bilateral treaties with France and Britain which might be strengthened to improve security.

    D.   It hints vaguely at "existing new possibilities for ensuring security in Europe," probably to keep speculation going.

VI. As in previous notes, the Kremlin by-passed the Western proposal for negotiations on an Austrian state treaty.

VII. The Malenkov regime has also been refusing during the last few months to permit the holding of a Korean political conference:

    A.   This 3 November note asserts that the USSR cannot accept the UN's invitation since the US Government will not agree to other "neutrals."

B. The USSR probably wishes to avoid

opposing Western proposals, such as

free elections in Korea as well as

Germany, which would command wide

popular support.

VIII. The Kremlin has apparently concluded that

it will be easier to blame the United

States for failure to settle East-West

differences if it does not reveal its

unyielding hand at the conference table.

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